In a Flash, a Grim Recognition.

“The initial reaction of traders to the Flash Crash was that some human must have made a mistake submitting a trade. But the SEC…hasn’t found evidence of a ‘Fat Fingered Louie’ punching a billion rather than a million on an order. In fact, the SEC still doesn’t know what caused this crash. Curiously, no one is focusing on what caused the crash to stop…JP Morgan and Merrill Lynch were big buyers precisely as the market hit minus one thousand points on the Dow. It seems rather odd that both these firms at the same time would see the same trading opportunity.

In fact, what they did was violate one of the prime rules of trading: never try to catch a falling knife. The market was falling fast and furious at the point they entered the pit to buy equity futures, so why did they take such an enormous risk? We learned yesterday that both of these firms, plus Goldman Sachs, were such superb traders in the market that none of them had a single losing trading day all last quarter. This type of risky trade is not how you get to be a superb trader.“

Over at the Agonist, Numerian digs deep into last week’s “Flash Crash” — and comes to some very troubling conclusions. To wit, the big players know the thresholds where the trading algorithms kick in, and thus, basically, the fix is in. “The stock market seems to be nothing but a playground for the big banks and other connected firms who get a preview peek at everything that goes through the market, and who can program their computers to skim profits off daily with no risk whatever. The stock market is also, quite possibly, prone to more serious manipulation that resulted in last Thursday’s crash.“

Oof. I’m out of my comfort zone when it comes to understanding market behavior, so I hope someone has a better explanation for the Flash Crash than the disconcertingly plausible one offered here. (Just saying Greece doesn’t quite cut it, I don’t think.)

FinReg: Where Things Stand.

“Last week, Congress decided it would not confront Too Big To Fail, the single gravest threat to our collective financial security. But there are still several key Wall Street reforms worth fighting for–reforms that must be enacted before the next crisis hits, with or without a big bank break-up. And fortunately, key Senators have authored amendments dealing with each one.” In HuffPo, Zach Carter delineates the most worthwhile progressive amendments to financial reform still up for debate in the Senate. A good encapsulation of the state of play.

Bank to Basics.

“The big U.S. banks were the source of the global financial crisis, in part because their bigness and their practices were copied by major banks around the world. What happens in this reform effort is being watched avidly in many countries, because it will say much about how global finance is to be conducted. What is often missing in these discussions are the assumptions people make about banking and its role in a modern economy. We should begin therefore with some first principles.“

As the manifestly fradulent behavior by Goldman Sachs of late comes to full light — one among many, it seems — Numerian of The Agonist goes back to basics to make a case for strong banking reform. “The very first lesson we should learn from this crisis, which we thought this nation learned in the 1930s, is never again…The second lesson we should learn from this crisis is that we should not as a nation have to learn these lessons over and over again every 80 years. Something has to be done to make the legislative changes this time stick.”

Hudson Hawks (Lehman’s Garbage).

“‘How can anyone — regulators, investors or anyone — understand what’s in these financial statements if they have to dig 15 layers deep to find these kinds of interlocking relationships and these kinds of transactions?’ said Francine McKenna, an accounting consultant who has examined the financial crisis on her blog, re: The Auditors. “‘Everybody’s talking about preventing the next crisis, but they can’t prevent the next crisis if they don’t understand all these incestuous relationships.’“

The NYT delves into the sordid story of Hudson Castle, a.k.a. Lehman Brothers’ alter-ego, which they used to squirrel away shady investments. (This shell game didn’t even make the recent Lehman report, which apparently found enough “materially misleading” behavior to warrant criminal charges against Lehman’s leadership.)

Regulators, Mount Up.

“Unfortunately, there are some in the financial industry who are misreading this moment. Instead of learning the lessons of Lehman and the crisis from which we are still recovering, they are choosing to ignore them. They do so not just at their own peril, but at our nation’s. So I want them to hear my words: We will not go back to the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses. Those on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without regard for consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break their fall.“

In the bowels of Wall Street and one year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, President Obama outlines his vision for financial regulatory reform, including a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency and stronger accountability and oversight in the existing regulatory regime. [Transcript.]

But — see also health care — some wonder if the President is going far enough: “The problem with concentrating on the banking system is that it allows the administration to present an overly optimistic assessment of its actions…Taking credit for stabilizing the financial system after feeding it with massive amounts of federal money is like a teacher bragging about turning around the academic performance of a failing student after handing them all the answers to the big tests.“

Continues economist Nomi Prins, in an analysis that dovetails quite tellingly with the health-care situation:”A strong CFPA is a sensible plan…This proposal has drawn the most ire from the banking community, so you know it’s good…But Obama’s reforms do not strike deeply enough. The banking crisis has been subdued, not fixed, because of enormous amounts of government assistance. Ignoring that fact, and failing to overhaul the sector, leaves us open to another crisis. And the next round will be worse, because there is now so much more federal money invested in the banks.”

Atlas Hemmed and Hawed.

“Somewhere in literary-character hell, John Galt is spending an eternity getting beat down by Tom Joad & his pick handle.” Ah, Ayn Rand…come for the vaguely kinky sex, stay for the self-serving, thoroughly reprehensible philosophy. Salon‘s Andrew Leonard asks if the recent economic downturn has discredited Rand’s Objectivism once and for all, prompting — as you might expect — a war in the comments section between the true believers and the gleeful cynics.

Among the many funny comments, this one, reposted from here: “There are two novels that can change a bookish fourteen-year old’s life: The Lord of the Rings and Atlas Shrugged. One is a childish fantasy that often engenders a lifelong obsession with its unbelievable heroes, leading to an emotionally stunted, socially crippled adulthood, unable to deal with the real world. The other, of course, involves orcs.”

42 Doin’ Work.

“If there is part of him that secretly covets Obama’s job, he is burying it inside. ‘I like my life now,’ he said. ‘I loved being president and it’s a good thing we had a constitutional limit or I’d have made the people take me out in a pine box, probably. But we had a constitutional limit and I knew that in the beginning. And so when I left, I had to go out and create another life. And I did it, and I love doing it.’“

In a wide-ranging piece in the NYT Magazine, Peter Baker checks in on the post-presidency of William Jefferson Clinton. Among the topics discussed: Election 2008 fallout — Obama is forgiven, Kennedy and Richardson are not — and Clinton’s retrospective view of his own administration’s economic policy in light of the “Great Recession.” “He added: ‘If you ask me to write the indictment, I’d say: “I wish Bill Clinton had said more about derivatives. The Republicans probably would have stopped him from doing it, but at least he should have sounded the alarm bell.”‘”

A Consumers’ Republic.

“The Federal Reserve was supposed to do this, but they were asleep at the switch.” In light of recent shenanigans, the Obama administration contemplates creating a new regulatory commission for the financial services industry. “Responsibility for regulation of consumer financial products is currently distributed among a patchwork of federal agencies. Some of these regulators regard consumer protection as a low priority. And some financial products are not regulated at all. The proposal could centralize enforcement of existing laws and create a vehicle for imposing tougher rules.” Sounds alright by me.

Obama’s Progressive Solution.

“Officials said the proposal would seek a broad new role for the Federal Reserve to oversee large companies, including major hedge funds, whose problems could pose risks to the entire financial system.” With the AIG bonuses setting the table, the Obama administration prepares to unveil an overhaul of the nation’s financial regulatory apparatus. “It will propose that many kinds of derivatives and other exotic financial instruments that contributed to the crisis be traded on exchanges or through clearinghouses so they are more transparent and can be more tightly regulated. And to protect consumers, it will call for federal standards for mortgage lenders beyond what the Federal Reserve adopted last year, as well as more aggressive enforcement of the mortgage rules.”

Whatever malarkey you hear from the GOP about “creeping socialism” over the next few weeks, keep in mind that no less a Republican than Teddy Roosevelt deemed this sort of solution — accountability, transparency, tighter oversight of the financial sector by the federal government — the “New Nationalism” a century ago. In this arena, at least so far, President Obama seems to be living up to his Progressive promise.

Update: “‘Our system failed in basic fundamental ways,’ Geithner told the committee. ‘Compensation practices rewarded short-term profits over long-term returns. Pervasive failures in consumer protection left many Americans with obligations they did not understand and could not sustain. The huge apparent returns to financial activity attracted fraud on a dramatic scale..,To address this will require comprehensive reform. Not modest repairs at the margin, but new rules of the game. And the new rules must be simpler and more effectively enforced.‘” Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner unveils the new regulatory package. [Highlights.] “He said financial products and institutions should be regulated according to their economic function and the risks they pose, not their legal form. ‘We can’t allow institutions to cherry-pick among competing regulators and shift risk to where it faces the lowest standards and weakest constraints,’ he told the committee.”

Risky Business.

“What’s interesting about the Madoff scandal, in retrospect, is how little interest anyone inside the financial system had in exposing it…OUR financial catastrophe, like Bernard Madoff’s pyramid scheme, required all sorts of important, plugged-in people to sacrifice our collective long-term interests for short-term gain. The pressure to do this in today’s financial markets is immense. Obviously the greater the market pressure to excel in the short term, the greater the need for pressure from outside the market to consider the longer term. But that’s the problem: there is no longer any serious pressure from outside the market.“

In an extended NYT editorial, authors Michael Lewis and David Einhorn survey recent economic developments with an eye to the broader problem: a financial institutional culture that fosters and legitimates idiotic amounts of risk. “The fixable problem isn’t the greed of the few but the misaligned interests of the many…The tyranny of the short term has extended itself with frightening ease into the entities that were meant to, one way or another, discipline Wall Street, and force it to consider its enlightened self-interest.“

Among the culprits in Lewis and Einhorn’s worthwhile dissection: the credit rating agencies. “In pursuit of their own short-term earnings, they did exactly the opposite of what they were meant to do: rather than expose financial risk they systematically disguised it. ” See also: the S.E.C. “Created to protect investors from financial predators, the commission has somehow evolved into a mechanism for protecting financial predators with political clout from investors…And here’s the most incredible thing of all: 18 months into the most spectacular man-made financial calamity in modern experience, nothing has been done to change that, or any of the other bad incentives that led us here in the first place.“

It’s not all doom, gloom, and (highly justified) finger-pointing. In part two of the editorial, Lewis and Einhorn offer some quick fixes to our current institutional myopia that should be relatively simple to put through…in a perfect world. “The funny thing is, there’s nothing all that radical about most of these changes. A disinterested person would probably wonder why many of them had not been made long ago. A committee of people whose financial interests are somehow bound up with Wall Street is a different matter.“